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Abstract. We investigate when non-dictatorial aggregation is possible
from an algorithmic perspective. We consider the setting in which the
members of a society take a position on a fixed collection of issues, where
for each issue several different alternatives are possible, but the combina-
tion of choices must belong to a given set X of allowable voting patterns.
Such a set X is called a possibility domain if there is an aggregator that
is non-dictatorial, operates separately on each issue, and returns values
among those cast by the society on each issue. We design a polynomial-
time algorithm that decides, given a set X of voting patterns, whether or
not X is a possibility domain. Furthermore, if X is a possibility domain,
then the algorithm constructs in polynomial time such a non-dictatorial
aggregator for X. We also design a polynomial-time algorithm that de-
cides if X is a uniform possibility domain, that is, a possibility domain
for which non-dictatorial aggregation is possible, uniformly for all issues
and when restricted to any two positions for each issue. As in the case
of possibility domains, the algorithm also constructs in polynomial time
a uniform non-dictatorial aggregator, if one exists.
1 Introduction
The study of vote aggregation has occupied a central place in social choice the-
ory. A fairly general framework for carrying out this study is as follows. There
is a fixed collection of issues on each of which every member of a society takes
a position, that is, for each issue, a member of the society can choose between
a number of alternatives. However, not every combination of choices is allowed,
which means that the vector of the choices made by a member of the society
must belong to a given set X of allowable voting patterns, called feasible evalu-
ations. The goal is to investigate properties of aggregators, which are functions
that take as input the votes cast by the members of the society and return as
output a feasible evaluation that represents the collective position of the society
on each of the issues at hand. A concrete key problem studied in this framework
is to determine whether or not a non-dictatorial aggregator exists, i.e., whether
or not it is possible to aggregate votes in such a way that individual members
of the society do not impose their voting preferences on the society. A set X of
feasible evaluations is called a possibility domain if it admits a non-dictatorial
aggregator; otherwise, X is called an impossibility domain. This framework is
broad enough to account for several well-studied cases of vote aggregation, in-
cluding the case of preference aggregation for which Arrow [1] established his
celebrated impossibility theorem and the case of judgment aggregation [10].
Much of the investigation of the existence of non-dictatorial aggregators has
been carried out under two assumptions: (a) the aggregators are independent
of irrelevant alternatives (IAA); and (b) the aggregators are conservative (also
known as supportive). The IAA assumption means that the aggregator is an
issue-by-issue aggregator, so that an IAA aggregator on m issues can be iden-
tified with an m-tuple (f1, . . . , fm) of functions aggregating the votes on each
issue. The conservativeness (or supportiveness) assumption means that, for ev-
ery issue, the position returned by the aggregator is one of the positions held by
the members of the society on that issue.
By now, there is a body of research on identifying criteria that characterize
whether or not a given set X of feasible evaluations is a possibility domain. The
first such criterion was established by Dokow and Holzman [8] in the Boolean
framework, where, for each issue, there are exactly two alternatives (say, 0 and 1)
for the voters to choose from. Specifically, Dokow and Holzman [8] showed that
a set X ⊆ {0, 1}m is a possibility domain if and only if X is affine or X is not
totally blocked. In informal terms, the notion of total blockedness, which was first
introduced in [14], asserts that any position on any issue can be inferred from
any position on any issue. As regards the non-Boolean framework (where, for
some issues, there may be more than two alternatives), Dokow and Holzman [9]
extended the notion of total blockedness and used it to give a sufficient condition
for a set X of feasible evaluations to be a possibility domain. Szegedy and Xu [17]
used tools from universal algebra to characterize when a totally blocked set X of
feasible evaluations is a possibility domain. A consequence of these results is that
a set X of feasible evaluations is a possibility domain if and only if X admits
a binary non-dictatorial aggregator or a ternary non-dictatorial aggregator; in
other words, non-dictatorial aggregation is possible for a society of some size if
and only if it is possible for a society with just two members or with just three
members. This line of investigation was pursued further by Kirousis et al. [11],
who characterized possibility domains in terms of the existence of binary non-
dictatorial aggregators or ternary non-dictatorial aggregators of particular form.
The aforementioned investigations have characterized possibility domains (in
both the Boolean framework and the non-Boolean framework) in terms of struc-
tural conditions. Our goal in this paper is to investigate possibility domains
using the algorithmic lens and, in particular, to study the following algorithmic
problem: given a set X of feasible evaluations, determine whether or not X is
a possibility domain. Szegedy and Xu [17, Theorem 37] give algorithms for this
problem, but these algorithms have very high running time; in fact, they run in
exponential time, even when confined in the Boolean framework.
2
We design a polynomial-time algorithm that, given a set X of feasible evalu-
ations (be it in the Boolean or the non-Boolean framework), determines whether
or notX is a possibility domain. In addition, ifX is a possibility domain, then the
algorithm can also produce a binary non-dictatorial or a ternary non-dictatorial
aggregator for X . Along the way, we also show that there is a polynomial-time
algorithm for determining, given X , whether or not X is totally blocked. After
this, we turn attention to uniform possibility domains, which were introduced
in [11] and constitute a proper subclass of the class of possibility domains. Intu-
itively, uniform possibility domains are sets of feasible evaluations for which non-
dictatorial aggregation is possible, uniformly for all issues and when restricted
to any two positions for each issue. In [11], a tight connection was established
between uniform possibility domains and constraint satisfaction by showing that
multi-sorted conservative constraint satisfaction problems on uniform possibil-
ity domains are tractable, whereas such constraint satisfaction problems defined
on all other domains are NP-complete. Here, using results of Carbonnel [6], we
give a polynomial-time algorithm for the following decision problem: given a set
X of feasible evaluations (be it in the Boolean or the non-Boolean framework),
determine whether or not X is a uniform possibility domain; moreover, if X is a
uniform possibility domain, then the algorithm can produce a suitable uniform
non-dictatorial aggregator for X .
The results reported here contribute to the developing field of computational
social choice and pave the way for further exploration of algorithmic aspects of
vote aggregation.
2 Preliminaries and Earlier Work
2.1 Possibility Domains
Suppose we have a fixed set I = {1, . . . ,m} of issues. Assume that the possible
position values of an individual (member of a society) for issue j are given by
the finite set Aj , where j = 1, . . . ,m.
We assume that each Aj has cardinality at least 2. If |Aj | = 2 for all j ∈
{1, . . . ,m}, we say we are in the binary or Boolean framework; otherwise we say
that we are in the non-binary or non-Boolean framework.
An evaluation is any element of
∏m
j=1 Aj . Let X ⊆
∏m
j=1Aj denote a set of
permissible or feasible evaluations. As a non-degeneracy condition, we assume
that for each j = 1, . . . ,m, the j-th projectionXj ofX , has at least two elements.
Let n ≥ 2 represent the number of individuals. We view the elements of Xn
as n×m matrices that represent the choices of all individuals over every issue.
The element xij of such a matrix will be the choice of the i-th individual over the
j-th issue, for i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . ,m. The i-th row xi will represent the
choices of the i-th individual over every issue, i = 1, . . . , n, and the j-th column
xj the choices of every individual over the j-th issue, j = 1, . . . ,m.
To aggregate a set of n feasible evaluations, we will use m-tuples of functions
f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm), where fj : A
n
j 7→ Aj , j = 1, . . . ,m. Such a m-tuple of functions
will be called an (n-ary) aggregator for X if the following two conditions hold:
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1. f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm) is conservative, i.e., if for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, we have that
if xj = (x
1
j , . . . , x
n
j ) ∈ A
n
j , then fj(xj) ∈ {x
1
j , . . . , x
n
j };
2. for all x1 ∈ A
n
1 , . . . , xm ∈ A
n
m, we have that
if (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Xn, then (f1(x1), . . . , fm(xm)) ∈ X.
An aggregator f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm) is called dictatorial on X if there is a number
d ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that (f1, . . . fm) ↾ X = (pr
n
d , . . . , pr
n
d ) ↾ X , i.e., (f1, . . . fm)
restricted to X is equal to (prnd , . . . , pr
n
d ) restricted to X , where pr
n
d is the n-ary
projection on the d-th coordinate; otherwise, f¯ is called non-dictatorial on X .
We say that X has a non-dictatorial aggregator if, for some n ≥ 2, there is a
n-ary non-dictatorial aggregator on X .
A set X of feasible evaluations is called a possibility domain if it has a non-
dictatorial aggregator. Otherwise, it is called an impossibility domain. A possi-
bility domain is, by definition, one where aggregation is possible for societies of
some cardinality, namely, the arity of a non-dictatorial aggregator.
The notion of an aggregator is akin to, but different from, the notion of a
polymorphism - a fundamental notion in universal algebra (see Szendrei [18]).
Let A be a finite non-empty set. A constraint language over A is a finite set
Γ of relations of finite arities.
Let R be an m-ary relation on A. We say that a function f : An 7→ A is a
polymorphism of R if the following condition holds:
if x1, . . . , xn ∈ R, then (f(x1), . . . , f(xn)) ∈ R,
where xi = (xi1, . . . , x
i
m) ∈ R, i = 1, . . . , n and xj = (x
1
j , . . . , x
n
j ), j = 1, . . . ,m.
In this case, we also say that R is closed under f or that f preserves R. Finally,
we say that f is a polymorphism of a constraint language Γ if f preserves every
relation R ∈ Γ .
A function f : An 7→ A is conservative if, for all a1, . . . , an ∈ A, we have that
f(a1, . . . , an) ∈ {a1, . . . , an}.
Clearly, if f : An 7→ A is a conservative polymorphism of an m-ary relation
R on A, then the m-tuple f¯ = (f, . . . , f) is an n-ary aggregator for R.
We say that a ternary operation f : A3 7→ A on an arbitrary set A is a
majority operation if for all x and y in A,
f(x, x, y) = f(x, y, x) = f(y, x, x) = x;
we also say that f is a minority operation if for all x and y in A,
f(x, x, y) = f(x, y, x) = f(y, x, x) = y.
We say that f : An 7→ A is a weak near-unanimity operation [12] if, for all
x, y ∈ A, we have that
f(y, x, x, . . . , x) = f(x, y, x, . . . , x) = . . . = f(x, x, x, . . . , y).
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In particular, a ternary weak near-unanimity operation is a function f : A3 7→ A
such that for all x, y ∈ A, we have that
f(y, x, x) = f(x, y, x) = f(x, x, y).
Thus, the notion of a ternary weak near-unanimity operation is a common gen-
eralization of the notions of a majority operation and a minority operation.
We also say that a set X of feasible evaluations admits a majority (respec-
tively, minority) aggregator if it admits a ternary aggregator every component
of which is a majority (respectively, minority) operation. Clearly, X admits a
majority aggregator if and only if there is a ternary aggregator f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm)
for X such that, for all j = 1, . . . ,m and for all two-element subsets Bj ⊆ Xj ,
we have that fj↾ Bj = maj, where
maj(x, y, z) =
{
x if x = y or x = z,
y if y = z.
Similarly, X admits a minority aggregator if and only if there is a ternary ag-
gregator f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm) for X such that, for all j = 1, . . . ,m and for all
two-element subsets Bj ⊆ Xj, we have that fj↾ Bj = ⊕, where
⊕(x, y, z) =


z if x = y,
x if y = z,
y if x = z.
Finally, we say that X admits a ternary weak near-unanimity aggregator f¯ =
(f1, . . . , fm), if it admits a ternary aggregator every component of which is a
weak near-unanimity operation, i.e. for all j = 1, . . . ,m and for all x, y ∈ Xj , we
have that fj(y, x, x) = fj(x, y, x) = fj(x, x, y).
It is known that in the Boolean framework a set X admits a majority ag-
gregator if and only if X is a bijunctive logical relation, i.e., X is a subset of
{0, 1}m that is the set of satisfying assignments of a 2CNF-formula. Moreover,
X admits a minority aggregator if and only if X is an affine logical relation, i.e.,
X is a subset of {0, 1}m that is the set of solutions of linear equations over the
two-element field (see Schaefer [15]).
The following two theorems characterize possibility domains in the Boolean
framework and in the non-Boolean framework, respectively. These results are the
stepping stones towards showing that the following decision problem is solvable
in polynomial time: given a set X of feasible evaluations, is X a possibility
domain?
Theorem A (Dokow and Holzman [8]) Let X ⊆ {0, 1}m be a set of feasible
evaluations. The following two statements are equivalent.
– X is a possibility domain.
– X is affine or X admits a binary non-dictatorial aggregator.
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Theorem B (Kirousis et al. [11]) Let X be a set of feasible evaluations. The
following two statements are equivalent.
1. X is a possibility domain.
2. X admits a binary non-dictatorial aggregator, or a majority aggregator, or
a minority aggregator.
2.2 Uniform Possibility Domains
We now turn our attention to a subclass of possibility domains, first defined
in [11], called uniform possibility domains.
Let f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm) be an n-ary aggregator forX . We say that f¯ is a uniform
non-dictatorial aggregator for X (of arity n) if, for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and for




for all d ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We say that X is a uniform possibility domain if it has a
uniform non-dictatorial aggregator of some arity n.
Clearly, if X is a uniform possibility domain, then X is also a possibility
domain. The converse, however, is not true. To see this, suppose that X is a
cartesian productX = Y ×Z, where Y ⊆
∏l
j=1 Aj and Z ⊆
∏m
j=l+1 Aj , with 1 ≤
l < m. If Y or Z is an impossibility domain, then X is not a uniform possibility
domain, although it is a possibility domain, as every Cartesian product of two
sets is a possibility domain.
The next result provides a characterization of uniform possibility domain.
It is the stepping stone towards showing that the following decision problem is
solvable in polynomial time: given a set X of feasible evaluations, is X a uniform
possibility domain?
Theorem C (Kirousis et al. [11]) Let X be a set of feasible evaluations. The
following two statements are equivalent.
1. X is a uniform possibility domain.
2. X admits a ternary weak near-unanimity aggregator.
3 Results
In this section, we show that there are polynomial-time algorithms for telling,
given a set X of feasible evaluations, whether or not X is a possibility domain
and whether or not X is a uniform possibility domain.
3.1 Tractability of Possibility Domains
As seen earlier, Theorems A and B provide necessary and sufficient conditions
for a set X to be a possibility domain in the Boolean framework and in the non-
Boolean framework, respectively. Admitting a binary non-dictatorial aggregator
is a condition that appears in both these characterizations. Our first result asserts
that this condition can be checked in polynomial time.
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Theorem 1. There is a polynomial-time algorithm for solving the following
problem: given a set X of feasible evaluations, determine whether or not X
admits a binary non-dictatorial aggregator and, if it does, produce one.
Proof. We will show that the existence of a binary non-dictatorial aggregator on
X is tightly related to connectivity properties of a certain directed graph HX
that we now introduce.
If X ⊆
∏m
j=1 Aj is a set of feasible evaluations, then HX is the following
directed graph:
– The vertices of HX are the pairs of distinct elements u, u
′ ∈ Xj , for j ∈
{1, . . . ,m}. Each such vertex will usually be denoted by uu′j. When the
coordinate j is understood from the context, we will often be dropping the
subscript j, thus denoting such a vertex by uu′.
Also, if u ∈ Xj, for some j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, we will often use the notation uj
to indicate that u is an element of Xj .
– Two vertices uu′k and vv
′
l, where k 6= l, are connected by a directed edge from
uu′k to vv
′




l, if there are a total evaluation z ∈ X that
extends the partial evaluation (uk, vl) and a total evaluation z
′ ∈ X that
extends the partial evaluation (u′k, v
′
l), such that there is no total evaluation
y ∈ X that
1. extends (uk, v
′
l);
2. for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, we have that yi = zi or yi = z
′
i.
For vertices uu′k, vv
′





to denote the existence of a directed path from uu′k and to vv
′
l.
We now state and prove two lemmas.
Lemma 1. Let f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm) be a binary aggregator on X.
1. Assume that uu′k → vv
′
l. If fk(u, u
′) = u, then fl(v, v
′) = v.
2. Assume that uu′k →→ vv
′
l. If fk(u, u
′) = u, then fl(v, v
′) = v.
Proof. The first part of the lemma follows from the definitions and the fact
that f¯ is conservative. Indeed, if uu′k → vv
′
l, then there are a total evaluation
z = (z1, . . . , zm) ∈ X that extends (uk, vl) (i.e., zk = u and zl = v) and a
total evaluation z′ = (z′1, . . . , z
′









′), such that there is no total evaluation in X that extends (uk, v
′
l) and
agrees with z or with z′ on every coordinate. Consider the total evaluation
(f1(z1, z
′
1), . . . , fm(zm, z
′
m)), which is in X because f¯ is an aggregator on X .
Since each fj is conservative, we must have that fj(zj , z
′
j) ∈ {zj, z
′
j}, for every j,
hence fl(zl, z
′
l) = fl(v, v
′) ∈ {v, v′}. Consequently, if fk(u, u
′) = u, then we must
have fl(v, v
′) = v, else (f1(z1, z
′
1), . . . , fm(zm, z
′
m)) extends (uk, v
′
l) and agrees
with z or with z′ on every coordinate.
The second part of the lemma follows from the first part by induction. ⊓⊔
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Lemma 2. The set X admits a binary non-dictatorial aggregator if and only if
the directed graph HX is not strongly connected.
Proof. We first show that if X admits a binary non-dictatorial aggregator, then
HX is not strongly connected. In the contrapositive form, we show that if HX
is strongly connected, then X admits no binary non-dictatorial aggregator. This
is an easy consequence of the preceding Lemma 1. Indeed, assume that HX
is strongly connected and let f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm) be a binary aggregator on X .
Take two distinct elements x and x′ of X1. Since f¯ is conservative, we have that
f1(x, x
′) ∈ {x, x′}. Assume first that f1(x, x
′) = x. We claim that fj ↾ Xj = pr
2
1 ↾
Xj , for every j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. To see this, let y and y
′ be two distinct elements
of Xj , for some j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Since HX is strongly connected, we have that
xx′1 →→ yyj. Since also f1(x, x
′) = x, Lemma 1 implies that fj(y, y
′) = y =
pr21(y, y
′) and so fj ↾ Xj = pr
2
1 ↾ Xj . Next, assume that f1(x, x
′) = x′. We claim
that fj ↾ Xj = pr
2
2 ↾ Xj , for every j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. To see this, let y and y
′ be two
distinct elements of Xj, for some j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. SinceHX is strongly connected,
we have that yy′j →→ xx
′
1, hence, if fj(y, y
′) = y, then, Lemma 1, implies that
f(x, x′) = x, which is a contradiction because x 6= x′. Thus, fj(y, y
′) = y′ and
so fj ↾ Xj = pr
2
2 ↾ Xj .









l in HX , i.e.,
it is not true that uu′k →→ vv
′
l. Let V1, V2 be a partition of the vertex set such
that uu′k ∈ V1, vv
′
l ∈ V2, and there is no edge from a vertex in V1 to a vertex in
V2. We will now define a binary aggregator f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm) and prove that it
is non-dictatorial, which will complete the proof.
Given z, z′ ∈ X , we set fj(zj , z
′
j) = zj if zz
′





if zz′j ∈ V2, for j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Since uu
′
k ∈ V1, we have that fk ↾ Xk 6= pr
2
2 ↾ Xk;
similarly, since vv′l ∈ V2, we have that fl ↾ Xl 6= pr
2
1 ↾ Xl. Consequently, f¯ is not
a dictatorial function on X . Thus, what remains to be proved is that if z, z,′∈ X ,
then f¯(z, z′) ∈ X . For this, we will show that if f¯(z, z′) 6∈ X , then there is an
edge from an element of V1 to an element of V2, which is a contradiction.
Assume that q = f¯(z, z′) 6∈ X . Let K be a minimal subset of {1, . . . ,m}
such that q ↾ K cannot be extended to a total evaluation w in X that agrees




′ is in X , it does not extend q ↾ K, hence there is a number
s ∈ K such that qs = fs(zs, z
′
s) = zs 6= z
′
s. It follows that the vertex zsz
′
s is in
V1. Similarly, since z is in X , it does not extend q ↾ K, hence there is a number




t 6= zt. It follows that the vertex ztz
′
t is in




t in HX . We will arrive at a









HX . Consider the set K \{t}. By the minimality of K, there is a total evaluation
w in X that extends q ↾ K \ {t} and agrees with z or with z′ outside K \ {t}.
In particular, we have that ws = qs = zs and wt = zt. Similarly, by considering
the set K \ {s}, we find that there is a total evaluation w′ in X that extends
q ↾ K \ {s} and agrees with z or with z′ outside K \ {s}. In particular, we have
that w′s = z
′
s and wt = qt = z
′
t. Note that w and w
′ agree on Y \ {s, t}. Since
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q ↾ K does not extend to a total evaluation that agrees with z or with z′ outside
K, we conclude that there is no total evaluation y in X that extends zsz
′
t and





we have arrived at a contradiction. This completes the proof of Lemma 2. ⊓⊔
We are now ready to complete the proof of Theorem 1. Given a set X of
feasible evaluations, the graph HX can be constructed in time bounded by a
polynomial in the size |X | of X (in fact, in time O(|X |5). There are well-known
polynomial-time algorithms for testing if a graph is strongly connected and, in
case it is not, producing the strongly connected components of the graph (e.g.,
Kosaraju’s algorithm presented in Sharir [16] and Tarjan’s algorithm [19]). Con-
sequently, by Lemma 2, there is a polynomial-time algorithm for determining
whether or not a given set X admits a binary non-dictatorial aggregator. More-
over, if X admits such an aggregator, then one can be constructed in polynomial-
time from the strongly connected components of HX via the construction in the
proof of Lemma 2. ⊓⊔
As mentioned in the Introduction, the existence of a binary non-dictatorial
aggregator on X is closely related to the total blockedness of X . More precisely,
the following result was proved in [11].
Theorem D (Kirousis et al. [11]) Let X be a set of feasible evaluations. The
following two statements are equivalent.
1. X is totally blocked.
2. X admits no binary non-dictatorial aggregator.
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorem 1 and The-
orem D.
Corollary 1. There is a polynomial-time algorithm for the following decision
problem: given a set X ⊆ {0, 1}m of feasible evaluations, is X totally blocked?
Furthermore, by combining Theorem 1 with Theorem A, we obtain the fol-
lowing result.
Theorem 2. There is a polynomial-time algorithm for the following decision
problem: given a set X ⊆ {0, 1}m of feasible evaluations in the Boolean frame-
work, determine whether or not it is a possibility domain.
Proof. By Theorem A, we have to check, given X ⊆ {0, 1}m, if X admits a
binary non-dictatorial aggregator or X is affine. Theorem 1 tells that the first
condition can be checked in polynomial time. Furthermore, X is affine if and
only if the function ⊕(x, y, z) is a polymorphism of X [15], hence the second
condition can also be checked in polynomial time (in fact, cubic time). ⊓⊔
We now turn to the problem of detecting possibility domains in the non-
Boolean framework.
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Theorem 3. There is a polynomial-time algorithm for solving the following
problem: given a set X of feasible evaluations, determine whether or not X is a
possibility domain and, if it is, produce a binary non-dictatorial aggregator for
X or a ternary non-dictatorial aggregator for X.
Proof. In view of Theorem B and Theorem 1, it suffices to show that there is
a polynomial-time algorithm that, given X , detects whether or not X admits a
majority aggregator or a minority aggregator, and, if it does, produces such an
aggregator.
Let X be a set of feasible evaluations, where I = {1, . . . ,m} is the set of
issues and Aj , j = 1, . . . ,m, are the sets of the position values. We define the







{(x, j) | x ∈ Aj}.
We also set
X˜ = {((x1, 1), . . . , (xm,m)) | (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ X} ⊆ A
m.
We will show that we can go back-and-forth between conservative majority or
minority polymorphisms for X˜ and majority or minority aggregators for X .
First, assume that f : An 7→ A is a conservative polymorphism for X˜ . We
define the m-tuple f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm) of n-ary functions f1, . . . , fm as follows: if
x1j , . . . , x
n
j ∈ Aj , for j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, then we set
fj(x
1
j , . . . , x
n
j ) = yj ,
where yj is such that f((x
1
j , j), . . . , (x
n
j , j)) = (yj , j). Such a yj exists and is
one of the xij ’s because f is conservative, and hence f((x
1
j , j), . . . , (x
n
j , j)) ∈
{(x1j , j), . . . , (x
n
j , j)}. It is easy to see that f¯ is an aggregator for X . Moreover, if
f is a majority or a minority operation on X˜ , then f¯ is a majority or a minority
aggregator on X .
Next, assume that f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm) is a majority or a minority aggregator
for X . We define a ternary function f : A3 → A as follows. Let (x, j), (y, k), (z, l)
be three elements of A.
– If j = k = l, then we set f((x, j), (y, k), (z, l)) = (fj(x, y, z), j).
– If j, k, l are not all equal, then
• if at least two of (x, j), (y, k), (z, l) are equal to each other, then we set
f((x, j), (y, k), (z, l)) = maj((x, j), (y, k), (z, l)),
if f¯ is a majority aggregator on X , and we set
f((x, j), (y, k), (z, l)) = ⊕((x, j), (y, k), (z, l)),
if f¯ is a minority aggregator on X ;
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• otherwise, we set f((x, j), (y, k), (z, l)) = (x, j).
It is easy to see that if f¯ is a majority or a minority aggregator for X , then f is
a conservative majority or a conservative minority polymorphism on X˜ .
It follows thatX admits a majority or a minority aggregator if and only if X˜ is
closed under a conservative majority or minority polymorphism. Now, Bessiere et
al. [2] and Carbonnel [7] design polynomial-time algorithms that detect if a given
constraint language Γ has a conservative majority or a conservative minority
polymorphism, respectively, and, when it has, compute such a polymorphism.
In our case, we only need to apply these results to Γ = {X˜}. ⊓⊔
3.2 Tractability of Uniform Possibility Domains
We now focus on uniform possibility domains. We begin by bringing into the pic-
ture a result by Carbonnel [6], which was obtained in the context of conservative
constraint satisfaction.
Recall that a constraint language is a finite set Γ of relations of finite arities
over a finite non-empty set A. The conservative constraint satisfaction prob-
lem for Γ , denoted by c-CSP(Γ ) is the constraint satisfaction problem for the
constraint language Γ that consists of the relations in Γ and, in addition, all
unary relations on A. Bulatov [3, 4] established a dichotomy theorem for the
computational complexity of c-CSP(Γ ). Specifically, he showed that if for every
two-element subset B of A, there is a conservative polymorphism f of Γ such
that f is binary and f ↾ B ∈ {∧,∨} or f is ternary and f ∈ {maj,⊕}, then
c-CSP(Γ ) is solvable in polynomial time; otherwise, c-CSP(Γ ) is NP-complete.
Carbonnel [6] showed that the aforementioned conditions that determine the
boundary of the dichotomy for c-CSP(Γ ) can be checked in polynomial time.
This result, which we state rigorously below, will be of interest to us in the
sequel.
Theorem E (Carbonnel [6]) There is a polynomial-time algorithm for solv-
ing the following problem: given a constraint language Γ on a set A, determine
whether or not for every two-element subset B ⊆ A, there is a conservative poly-
morphism f of Γ such that f is binary and f ↾ B ∈ {∧,∨} or f is ternary and
f ↾ B ∈ {maj,⊕}. Moreover, if such a polymorphism exists, then the algorithm
produces one in polynomial time.
The final result of this section is about the complexity of detecting uniform
possibility domains.
Theorem 4. There is a polynomial-time algorithm for solving the following
problem: given a set X of feasible evaluations, determine whether or not X is a
uniform possibility domain and, if it is, produce a ternary weak near-unanimity
aggregator for X.
Proof. In what follows, given a two-element set B, we will arbitrarily identify
its elements with 0 and 1. Consider the functions ∧3 and ∨3 on {0, 1}3, where
∧(3)(x, y, z) = (∧(∧(x, y), z)) and ∨(3) (x, y, z) = (∨(∨(x, y), z)).
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It is easy to see that the only ternary, conservative, weak near-unanimity func-
tions on {0, 1} are ∧3, ∨3, maj, and ⊕. This fact will be used in the sequel.
We will also make use of the following lemma, which also gives an alternative
formulation of the criterion in Bulatov’s dichotomy theorem for the conservative
constraint satisfaction problem [3, 4].
Lemma 3. Let Γ be a constraint language on set A. The following two state-
ments are equivalent.
1. For every two-element subset B ⊆ A, there exists a conservative polymor-
phism f of Γ (which, in general, depends on B), such that f is binary and
f↾B ∈ {∧,∨} or f is ternary and f↾B ∈ {maj,⊕}.
2. Γ has a ternary, conservative, weak near-unanimity polymorphism.
Proof. (1 ⇒ 2) Given a two-element subset B ⊆ A and a binary conservative
polymorphism f of Γ such that f↾B ∈ {∧,∨}, define f
′ to be the ternary opera-
tion such that f ′(x, y, z) = f(f(x, y), z), for all x, y, z ∈ A. It is easy to see that
f ′ is a conservative polymorphism of Γ as well and also that f ′↾B ∈ {∧
(3),∨(3)}.
From the hypothesis and the preceding argument, it follows that, for each
two-element subset B ⊆ A, there exists a ternary conservative polymorphism f
of Γ (which, in general, depends on B) such that f↾B ∈ {∧
(3),∨(3),maj,⊕}. For
each two-element subset B ⊆ A, select such a polymorphism and let f1, . . . , fN ,
N ≥ 1, be an enumeration of all these polymorphisms. Obviously the restric-
tion of each f i to its respective two element subset is a weak near-unanimity
operation.
Consider the ‘⋄’ operator (introduced in [5] and later on used in [11]), which
takes as input two ternary operations f, g : A3 7→ A and returns as output a
ternary operation f ⋄ g defined by
(f ⋄ g)(x, y, z) := f(g(x, y, z), g(y, z, x), g(z, x, y)).
It is again easy to see that, if f, g are conservative polymorphisms of Γ , then so
is (f ⋄g). Also, it can be verified that if B is a two-element subset of A such that
f↾B or g↾B is a weak near-unanimity operation, then so is (f ⋄ g)↾B (for details,
see [11]).
Consider now the iterated diamond operation h with
h := f1 ⋄ (f2 ⋄ (. . . ⋄ (fN−1 ⋄ fN ) . . .)).
By the preceding discussion, h is a conservative polymorphism such that h↾B is
a weak near-unanimous operation for every two-element subset B of A, hence h
itself is a weak near-unanimity, conservative, ternary operation of Γ .
(2⇒ 1) Let h be a ternary, conservative, weak near-unanimity polymorphism
of Γ . As mentioned earlier, the only ternary, weak near-unanimity functions on
{0, 1}3 are ∧(3),∨(3),maj,⊕. Thus, for every two-element subset B ⊆ A, we have
that h↾B ∈ {∧
(3),∨(3),maj,⊕}.
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If there is a two-element subset B ⊆ A such that h↾B ∈ {∧
(3),∨(3)}, then
consider the binary function g defined by





Obviously, g is a binary conservative polymorphism of Γ ; moreover, for every
two-element subset B ⊆ A, if h↾B ∈ {∧
(3),∨(3)}, then g↾B ∈ {∧,∨}. ⊓⊔
We are now ready to complete the proof of Theorem 4.
According to Theorem C, a set X of feasible evaluations is a uniform possi-
bility domain if and only if there is a ternary aggregator f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm) such
that each fj is a weak near-unanimity operation, i.e., for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and
for all x, y ∈ Xj , we have that
fj(x, y, y) = fj(y, x, y) = fj(y, y, x).
As in the proof of Theorem 3, we can go back-and-forth between X and the set
X˜, where
X˜ = {((x1, 1), . . . , (xm,m)) | (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ X},
and verify that X is a uniform possibility domain if and only if X˜ has a ternary,
conservative, weak near-unanimity polymorphism. Theorem E and Lemma 3
then imply that the existence of such a polymorphism can be tested in polyno-
mial time, and that such a polymorphism can be produced in polynomial time,
if one exists.
In this paper, we gave polynomial-time algorithms that take as input a set X
of feasible evaluations and determine whether or not X is a possibility domain
and a uniform possibility domain. In these algorithms, it is assumed that the
set X of feasible evaluations under consideration is given to us explicitly, i.e.,
X is given by listing all its elements. It is natural to ask how the complexity
of these problems may change if X is given implicitly via a succinct represen-
tation. This scenario occurs frequently in other areas of social choice and, in
particular, in judgment aggregation, where X is identified with the set of satis-
fying assignments of a Boolean formula (for surveys on judgment aggregation,
see [10, 13]).
The work reported here assumes that the aggregators are conservative, an
assumption that has been used heavily throughout the paper. There is a related,
but weaker, notion of an idempotent (or Paretian) aggregator f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm)
where each fj is assumed to be an idempotent function, i.e., for all x ∈ Xj, we
have that f(x, . . . , x) = x. Clearly, every conservative aggregator is idempotent.
In the Boolean framework, idempotent aggregators are conservative, but, in the
non-Boolean framework, the converse need not hold. It remains an open problem
to investigate the computational complexity of the existence of non-dictatorial
idempotent aggregators in the non-Boolean framework.
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